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I. INTRODUCTION
The scarcity of energy resources in the world today is and will
continue to be a major contributor to international conflict and
instability. A related issue that has recently divided the international community is the expropriation of alien investors' property
and acquired rights. On October 28, 1980, the Government of
Canada propounded the National Energy Program,1 raising
profound questions regarding these two international concerns.
The focus of the program was to increase public and private Canadian participation in the oil and gas industry within Canada.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alberta. LL.B. 1977, University of
Exeter; LL.M. 1979, University of Illinois.
1. CANADIAN DEP'T OF ENERGY, MINES AND REsouRcEs, THE NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM 1980 (Report No. EP80/4E) (1980) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY
PROGRAM].

2. Id. at 16-22.
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The Government stated that until recently Canadian oil and gas
policy was not motivated by the stability of the oil supply. Before
the mid-1970s, overseas oil was not only vastly cheaper than domestically produced oil, but also constituted a secure source of
oil.3 Despite a decrease in tax revenues from the domestic oil industry, the instability of the Middle East during the mid-1970s
caused the Canadian Government to promote that sector of industry. 4 As a result of this policy, oil and gas revenues rose from
1.2 billion dollars in 1970 to 11.1 billion dollars in 1979. 5 Although
the Government claimed that this increase in cash flow was
financed by oil consumers and the Canadian taxpayer through the
oil and gas pricing regime and taxation policy, it also claimed that
the taxation policy tended to favor those already in the industry.6
Since the overwhelming majority of these entities were subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, especially United States multinationals, the result was the complete domination of the Canadian
resource sector by foreign-controlled companies. 7 Of the top
twenty-five petroleum companies in Canada, seventeen are more
than fifty percent foreign-owned and controlled, accounting for
seventy-two percent of Canadian oil and gas sales.8 Even if the oil
and gas industry was more than fifty percent Canadian-owned,
the industry could still be foreign-controlled, as firms can be
effectively controlled by shareholders with far less than fifty percent of the equity.9
The Government has considered the future of the oil and gas
industry in Canada and believes that in the future the industry
will be dominated by foreign-controlled companies since such
companies control the land where exploration for further reserves
of oil and gas will take place. 10 Only 110 million of the 290 million
acres of frontier lands held under exploration permits are held by
Canadian-controlled companies.1" Moreover, the foreign-controlled companies dominate the equity participation in existing
and future oil sands plants, leaving only thirty-four percent of the
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
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equity in the syncrude plant to be controlled by Canadians."2 The
Government thus has concluded that future energy supplies will
be largely controlled by subsidiaries of foreign multinationals.13
To provide Canadians with energy security in a world in which
there is intense international competition for increasingly scarce
energy resources, the Government proposed inter alia the following measures.
(1) The Government proposed a new federal tax at the rate of
eight percent of net revenues relating to the production of oil and
gas royalty interests. Deductions from these net revenues (such as
exploration costs, capital cost allowances, and interest) will not be
allowed. If the oil and gas price were to rise more than one dollar
per barrel every six months, the rate of tax would also be reviewed. The tax applicable to net revenues earned after January
1, 1981 will not be deductible for income tax purposes. The Government stated that the rationale of the tax was to produce a high
marginal tax rate for firms that reinvest little of their cash flow.
The revenue from such firms would then support cash incentives
14
to more aggressive Canadian-controlled companies.
The Government acknowledged that there will be situations in
which firms are exposed to financial hardships due to provincial
royalty rates in excess of fifty percent, since the new tax does not
allow provincial royalties to be deducted before the federal tax is
applied. Thus the Government proposed that the province in
such cases should adjust its royalties.
(2) The Government proposed the imposition of a new natural
gas tax applicable to all gas sales in Canada, including those to
the export market. The immediate effect of the tax would be to
reduce exports of natural gas to the United States and other foreign markets from Alberta and British Columbia."5
(3) The Government proposed a continuation of the Oil Export
Charge. This is a tax levied on oil equal to the difference between
the domestic and the export price. The Government's basic rationale of the tax was to hinder provinces or producers from export12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 35. It is likely, however, that the Government of Canada in the

future may have to revise such a tax in the face of intense political pressure and
lobbying on the part of the oil industry in Canada and the affected Canadian
provinces, especially Alberta.
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ing oil from Canada, as long as the country remained a net importer of the precious commodity.16
(4) The Government proposed the elimination of the indirect
incentives through tax deductions, concentrating instead on incentive payments" to increase Canadian participation in the oil
and gas industry. The depletion allowance, equivalent to onethird of oil and gas exploration costs outside the Canada lands,
will be phased out by 1982. The Government also promised to
provide a replacement for the super-depletion allowance for exploration costs on Canada lands, which had expired on April 1,
1980.18

The Government realized that the reduction and abolition of
the depletion allowance would result in a drastic cutback in exploration activities vital to the achievement of Canadian energy
security.19 This would be due in part to the drastic cutback in the
cashflow of both foreign and domestic oil firms.20 To avoid such a
result, the Government created direct incentives for oil and gas
exploration and development that would encourage investment by
Canadian companies and individuals while discriminating against
the foreign-owned firms that benefited from the depletion allowance system. 1 Up to eighty percent of the eligible costs would be
covered by incentive payments depending on the percent of Canadian ownership. 22 Only firms with fifty to seventy-five percent
Canadian ownership, however, would be eligible for the incentive
payments.
(5) The most controversial legislative proposals, however, concerned the Government plan to ensure Canadian participation in
the Canada lands, including Canadian control of a significant
number of the larger national oil and gas firms. Both objectives
would lead to fifty percent Canadian ownership of the entire na16. Id. at 36.
17.
18.

Id. at 39.
Id.

19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 39-41. Subsequently the Government of Canada announced that it

would change the NEP to allow corporations at least 65% Canadian-owned to
qualify for the highest level of incentive payments available. This would amount

to approximately 80% of approved costs in the Canada lands and 35% of approved costs in provincial lands.
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tional resource sector by 1990.28 Under the British North America
Act,2 ' vast areas of Canada (comprising the Yukon, the Northwest

Territories, the Arctic islands, and the offshore continental shelf
area) come within federal jurisdiction.25 Stating that Canadian
citizens as owners and taxpayers of these Canada lands should
have a stake in decisions concerning oil and gas development in
these frontier areas, the Government proposed inter alia a legislative measure that reserved a twenty-five percent interest in every
right on the Canada lands to the Crown of Canada. 26 This re23. Id. at 42-52.
24. The federal jurisdiction over the Yukon and the Northwest Territories is
derived from the British North America Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict. 6, c.28, § 4:
"The Parliament of Canada may from time to time make provisions for the administration, peace, order, and good government of any territory not for the
time being included in any Province." The Territorial Councils also have legislative jurisdiction, but they remain subordinate to the Parliament of Canada. See
Northwest TerritoriesAct, CAN. Rnv. STAT. N-22 c.331, s.1 (1970), Yukon Act,
CAN. REV. STAT. Y-2, c.53, s.1 (1952-53). As to the assertion of federal control
over the Arctic region, see the extensive literature concerning Canada's extension of sovereignty over the Arctic islands and the Arctic waters: SmaTH, THE
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF CANADA's ARcTIc CLAIs (1952); THE
ARCTIC FRoNTmR, (R. MacDonald ed. 1966); Green, Canada and Arctic Sover-

eignty, 48 CAN. B. REv. 740 (1970); Head, CanadianClaims to TerritorialSovereignty in the Arctic Region, 9 McGmL L.J. 200 (1963); Inch, An Examination
of Canada's Claim to Sovereignty in the Arctic, 1 MANITOBA L. SCH. J. 31
(1962); Pharand, The Arctic Waters in Relation to Canada,in CANADIAN PERSPECTrVES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 434 (R. MacDonald, G.
Morris & D. Johnston eds. 1974); Reid, The Canadian Claim to Sovereignty
over the Waters of the Arctic, 12 CAN. Y.B. INr'L L. 111 (1974); Comment,
Creeping Jurisdictionin the Arctic: Has the Soviet Union Joined Canada?,13
HARv. INT'L L.J. 271 (1972).
25. At present, the maritime provinces of Canada, especially the province of
Newfoundland, dispute the federal jurisdiction over resources in the continental
shelf. See Reference Re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights, 65 D.L.R.2d 353
(1967). See also Caplan, Legal Issues of the Offshore Mineral Rights Dispute in
Canada,14 MCGmL L.J. 475 (1968); Head, The CanadianOffshore Mineral Reference: The Application of InternationalLaw to a Federal Constitution,18 U.
TORONTO L.J. 131 (1968).
26. Id. at 47. Section 61 of Bill C-48 (First Session, 32d Parliament, 29 Eliz.
11., 1980), which in part will implement the National Energy Program, states:
61(1) The interests and rights provided by this Act replace all oil and gas
interests and rights or prospects thereof acquired or vested in relation to
Canada Lands prior to the coming into force of this Act.
(2) No person shall have any right to claim or receive any compensation,
damages, indemnity or other form of relief from the Majesty in right of
Canada or from any servant or agent thereof for any acquired, vested or

480

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 14.475

served interest would be exercised by Petro-Canada, the stateowned oil company, or by some other designated Crown
corporation.27
Under the proposed legislative measures, the carried interest
(which does not burden the Crown with past or present exploration costs) would be converted to a working interest under which
the Crown shares the production costs until a particular field"
receives a production license. The Government defended its controversial proposal as being necessary to protect Canadian ownership of federal resources." The carried interest was also justified
by the Government's incentive grants to Canadian-controlled
companies of up to eighty percent of approved costs and the Government's past contribution to frontier exploration through tax
policies, such as the super depletion allowance.30 Opponents of
this controversial proposal regarded it as retroactive confiscation
without compensation, or at least as a retroactive change in the
rights and liabilities arising between the Government and the exploration companies.31 The Government further proposed that a
minimum of fifty percent Canadian ownership eventually be required for any production in the Canada lands and that use of a
high level of Canadian goods and services be required in the production of oil and gas on the Canada lands.3 2
(6) Finally, the Government evaluated proposals for Canadianizing the oil and gas industry through acquisition of foreigncontrolled companies. The Government stated that increased Canadian control of the oil and gas industry was necessary to ensure
fair and secure oil and gas production in Canada, and proposed
legislative measures in an effort to acquire several of the larger oil
future interest or right or any prospect thereof which is replaced or otherwise affected by this Act or for any duty or liability imposed by this Act.
It could be argued that this Sovereign Immunity Section impliedly recognizes
that confiscation without compensation is a feature of the National Energy Program, but then attempts to shield the Government from any requirement to
compensate individuals and corporations whose interests have been confiscated.
27. ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 47.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 44-48.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Report on Business, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 3, 1980, at B5;
Mar. 16, 1981, at B19.
32. ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 47.
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and gas firms. 3 Under the proposed legislation, the Government
would establish a Canadian Ownership Account to be financed
through taxation of all oil and gas consumption in Canada. PetroCanada would then use the Account to acquire equity shares of
the targeted firms in the open market. Once the acquisition program was fully under way, the Government would disperse to one
or more new Crown corporations some of the acquired assets to
allow Petro-Canada to diversify into other areas of the oil and gas
industry." For example, Petrofina Canada, the subsidiary of a
Belgian multinational, was acquired under this program.3 5 Other
proposed legislative measures to Canadianize industry included
the preferential treatment accorded by the National Energy
Board to Canadian-owned and -controlled firms in granting export licenses for oil and gas sales abroad." The Petroleum Monitoring Agency, founded in 1980, defines the necessary Canadian
ownership rates qualifying a firm for payments under the petro37
leum incentives program.
Predictably, the oil and gas industry reacted angrily to the National Energy Program.38 Both foreign-controlled and Canadianowned firms felt that the reduced cash flow from the new taxation
and the Canadianizing policies would dry up funds needed for exploration and development.3 9 Dome Petroleum, a marginally
Canadian-owned company, stated that it planned to "raise hell"
about the proposed twenty-five percent carried interest on federal
lands because of the serious implications for the company's
northern leases.40 Dome suggested two alternatives: first, the Government could exclude lands on which wells had been discovered;
second, the Government could purchase the twenty-five percent
interest to contribute to past exploration expenses and to replace
some of the lost asset value created from the retroactive change in

33. Id. at 9.
34. Id. at 51-52.
35. The takeover was announced in February 1981. Petro-Canada bought the

shares of Petrofina at slightly above market value.
36. ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 50.
37. Id. at 51.
38. See, e.g., The Financial Post, Mar. 28, 1980, at 8; Report on Business,
The Globe and Mail, Mar. 27, 1981, at B2.
39. See, e.g., Report on Business, The Globe and Mail, Mar. 16, 1981, at
B19.
40. Report on Business, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 3, 1980.
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the rules of frontier exploration.4 1 In order to take advantage of
the incentive payments offered under the National Energy Program,'4 2 Dome Petroleum subsequently created a largely Canadian-owned subsidiary, Dome Canada.

The United States headquarters of most of the affected foreign
entities also expressed their discontent. The policy of the United

States Department of State is to espouse the claims of United
States corporations if fifty percent or more of the voting shares
are owned by United States citizens. It also considers the claims
of United States shareholders in a company incorporated in a for-

eign state and in which United States nationals hold at least
twenty-five percent of the voting shares.' Thus, according to statistics in the Canadian National Energy Program, more than

fourteen of the largest twenty-five oil and gas firms in Canada can

have their claims presented by the Department of State.44 Argua-

bly, United States espousal of claims based on indirect beneficial
interests in foreign companies is contrary to international law and
practice. Many countries will present only the claims of companies organized under their own laws.' 5
The 1970 decision of the International Court of Justice in Bar-

41. Id.
42. For an analysis of the corporate restructuring see the Report on Business, The Globe and Mail, Mar. 14, 1981, at 31.
43. See R. LMLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION (1962); H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS 238-40 (1976).
44. ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 19-20.

45. Many of the Latin American and Central American states include in
their constitutions and statutes the "Calvo" clause whereby foreign-controlled
corporations organized under the laws of the host state are mandated to resolve
their disputes with the host state under that state's laws and under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the host state's courts. Further, such "Calvo" clauses require the
foreign-controlled corporation not to seek diplomatic protection by the government of the foreign-controlled corporation's home state.
The home state of the foreign-controlled corporation is not necessarily bound
by such "Calvo" clauses. When a national is injured, the home state has an international claim in its own right and is not bound by its national's submission
to the "Calvo" doctrine. For examples, see article 32 of the 1944 (as amended in
1964) Peru Constitution and article 21 of the 1947 Venezuelan Constitution. See
generally D. SHEA, THE CALvo CLAUSE (1955); F. DAwsON & I. HEAD, INTERNA-

(1971); Graham,
The Calvo Clause:Its Current Status as a ContractualRenunciation of Diplomatic Protection,6 TEx. INT'L L.J. 289 (1971). ,

TIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS
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celona Traction Light and Power Co. Ltd.46 may reinforce the belief that espousal of national shareholder claims by a government
is not an accepted international legal practice. Barcelona Traction involved a 1970 claim by Belgium on behalf of the Belgian
shareholders of the Canadian-incorporated Barcelona Traction
Company. 7 Through the use of exchange control restrictions, the
Spanish Government had made it impossible for the company to
pay its debts, causing three Spanish creditors of the company to
petition it into bankruptcy. A Spanish court declared the company bankrupt and ordered its assets seized.48 In addition, the
foreign management personnel were dismissed, and the holdings
of the foreign shareholders were declared invalid. 49 New shares
were issued to a Spanish company which took over the Barcelona
Traction group of companies located in Spain.
The facts of Barcelona Traction illustrated the workings of an
illegitimate form of creeping expropriation, but the International
Court of Justice did not declare the merits of the case.50 Spain's
preliminary objection-that Belgium had no locus standi to espouse the claims of shareholders in a company incorporated in
Canada-was upheld by the World Court.51 The court held, however, that while only the national state of the company could espouse claims concerning the company under international law,
Belgium might have maintained an independent cause of action
had it argued that the actions of the Spanish authorities directly
infringed upon the rights of the foreign shareholders.52 Moreover,
the right of Belgium to espouse the claims of the Belgian shareholders would arise also if the company ceased to exist.53 A
counterargument that could be presented by the United States or
46.

[1970] I.C.J. 3.

47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 8-9.

49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 50. Two of the Justices Fitzmaurice and Gros, stated in obiter that
Spain's action did amount to a disguised expropriation or confiscation of the
undertaking. Id. at 106, 273 (separate opinions). Another Justice, Tanaka, con-

cluded in obiter, however, that Belgium had failed to prove bad faith on the part
of the Spanish authorities. Id. at 159 (separate opinion).
51. For a critical analysis of Barcelona Traction, see Higgins, Aspects of the
Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., VA.
J. INT'L L. 327 (1971); Lillich & Metzger, Two Perspectives on the Barcelona
Traction Case, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 522 (1971).
52. [1970] I.C.J. at 37.
53. Id. at 42.
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similarly situated nations is that Barcelona Traction was wrongly
decided or is inapplicable today in view of the practice of incorporating in a country with which the company has no ties at all. A
company registered in Delaware, consequently, could be entirely
owned by non-United States nationals and carry on its activities
outside the United States. Even the United States Government
would not espouse the claims of such a company. Thus, the place
of incorporation should not be the most important factor in determining which government has the right to espouse the corporate claims.
II. EXPROPRIATION OF ALIEN INVESTORS' PROPERTY

Until World War I, the global community was in basic agreement that a state's taking of alien-owned property imposed an
obligation on that state to provide some form of compensation."
Expropriation was permissible only if undertaken on a non-discriminatory basis for reasons of public utility.5 5 This global consensus was due largely to the fact that until the end of World
War I international legal disputes still could be legitimately settled by the use or the threat of force. 56 The first sign in the dis-

ruption of this global consensus occurred as a result of the Soviet
revolution in 1917, in which the Marxist regime issued expropriatory decrees abolishing private ownership of the resource
and industry sectors in the Soviet Union.57 The Soviets refused to
54. See J. KUNZ, THE MEXIcAN EXPROPRIATIONS 3-4 (1940). On one of the
very rare occasions that a World Court has had to pronounce on the legal consequences of illegitimate expropriation, the principles were enunciated very
clearly. In Chorzow Factory, [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17, the Permanent Court
of International Justice had to rule on the legality of Poland's expropriations of
certain German interests including the Chorzow Factory after the Treaty of Versailles had ceded Upper Silesia to Poland: "It is a principle of international law
that reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the
damage which the nationals of the injured State have suffered as a result of the
act which is contrary to international law. . . ." Id. at 27-28.
55. Id. at 4. See also specific instances of expropriation outlined in S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTRNATIONAL LAW ch.3 (1953); The Case of Jonas King
(1853), reprinted in 6 J. MooRE, INTERNATONAL LAW DIEST § 913, at 262-64
(1906); The Expropriated Religious Properties Case [1920] 1 R.I.A.A. 7, re-

printed in

FRIEDMAN,

at 68-71.

56. The threat or use of force would include political and economic sanctions
in addition to the use of the military. See J. KUNZ, supra note 54.
57. For a detailed account of the Soviet dispute with the West over the expropriations, see G. KENNAN, RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN
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pay any compensation, 58 and the United States retaliated by refusing to recognize the Soviet Union, thus terminating Soviet
commercial and trade relations.59 Under the Litvinov Assignment,
the Soviets compensated United States nationals for confiscated
property in return for diplomatic recognition by the United
States and resumption of trade and commercial intercourse2 ° The
aliens whose property had been confiscated also protested retroactive imposition of responsibility upon them to contribute towards the satisfaction of foreign debts amassed by the previous
Tsarist regime and provisional government in 1917.1 Even in
these instances of early uncompensated expropriation, retroactive
imposition of liability was bitterly attacked.
Since the Russian revolution, and notably since World War II,
two conflicting trends have divided the global community on the
issue of expropriation of alien investors' property. The first trend
is the recognition that a transfer of technology, capital, knowhow, and services must occur between the industrialized world
and the developing countries in order to supply the populations
of those latter countries with sufficient resources and wealth to
satisfy fundamental human needs.62 The only feasible mechanism
to achieve such a transfer or creation of wealth and resources was
the multinational or transnational corporate form. These entities
operated either through direct investment (establishing a branch
of the company in the host state), or by incorporating a subsidiary in the host state according to that state's laws.6 3 It was never
(1960).
58. Id. at 190. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 22; 28 AM. J. INT'L L.
139 (Supp. at 2); K. GRZYBoWSKI, SovIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 97, 354
(1970).
59. K. GRZYBoWSKI, SovIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 354 (1970).
60. Id.

61. For the legal issues arising out of the Litvinov Assignment, see United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324

(1937).
62. See, e.g., The Report of the Group of Eminent Persons on the Role of
Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations,
U.N. Doc. E/5500/Add. 1 (Part 1)(1974), reprinted in 13

INT'L LEGAL MATERA

S

800, 809 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Report].
63. See Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-Examination, U.N. Doc. E/C/10/38/158-67 (1978). See also Multinational Corporations in
World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190/5 (1973), when the term multinational corporation is used to cover "all entities which control assets, factories,
mines, sales offices and the like, in two or more countries." Id.
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postulated, however, that they would act altruistically in the host
state. Virtually all corporate entities exist to make profits, to create revenues, and to expand operations in the interests of the
company. Ideally the multinational corporation would benefit the
host country while serving its own interests at the same time."
The second trend is the desire of newly emerging states to assert
economic sovereignty by expropriating or nationalizing the
foreign-controlled companies dominating major sources of their
economies. Corporate assets would be either dispersed to their
own nationals or transferred to state agencies or corporations. 5
The result of these two conflicting trends is illustrated by the
following events:"6 (1) the Mexican expropriations of foreignowned lands and companies; (2) the Iranian expropriations of foreign oil company assets; (3) the Egyptian expropriations of the
Suez properties; (4) the Indonesian expropriation of the Dutchowned properties; (5) the Brazilian expropriation of the American-controlled telephone utility services; (6) the Chilean expropriation of United States mining interests; (7) the Cuban expropriation of United States interests; (8) the Arab expropriations of
foreign multinational oil interests; and (9) the Canadian pro67
vincial expropriation of the potash industry in Saskatchewan.
64. Various attempts have been made to settle the conflict of interests by
international instruments. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (1972); OECD DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISEs (1976), reprinted in
15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 967 (1976). See also Oliver, The Andean ForeignIn-

vestment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct
Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972); Rubin, Reflections Concerning the United Nations Commission on TransnationalCorporations,70 AM. J.
INT'L L.

73 (1976).

65. For a discussion by the Group of Eminent Persons on how foreign-controlled corporations affect the development process, see Report, supra note 62,
at 809-19.
66. Most of the factual details surrounding these expropriations are found in
HOUSE STAFF COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., EXPROPRIATION
OF AMERICAN OWNED PROPERTY BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (Comm. Print 1963), reprinted in 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1066
(1963); BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REPORT ON NATIONALIZATION, EXPROPRIATION, AND OTHER TAKINGS OF UNITED
STATES AND CERTAIN FOREIGN PROPERTY SINCE 1960, reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL

84 (1971).
67. For an account of the details involved in the Saskatchewan expropriation
of the potash industry, see Molot & Laux, The Politics of Nationalization, 12
CAN. J. POL. Sci. 2 (1972). The power of a Canadian province to expropriate
MATERIALS
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Some form of compensation was ultimately paid to the aliens
whose property had been confiscated in each of these expropriations. 8 This indicates that the global utilitarian mathematical
formula may favor one basic limitation on a government's right to
interfere with private property rights-there must by some form
of compensation, regardless of the reasons for government
expropriation.
The activities of the United Nations General Assembly reinforce international recognition that expropriations must be compensated. In 1952 the General Assembly passed a resolution entitled "The Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and
Resources." 6' 9 This resolution, while not expressly stating the duty
to compensate, recommended that
all member states, in the exercise of their right freely to use or
exploit their natural wealth and resources whenever deemed desirable by them for their own progress and economic development, to
have due regard, consistent with their sovereignty, to the need for
maintaining the flow of capital in conditions of security, mutual
70
confidence and economic cooperation amongst nations.
The United States predictably voted against the resolution. Although the resolution expressed a desire to maintain the flow of
capital in a secure, confident, and cooperative environment, the
resolution failed to recognize the rights of private investors under
international law. 1
In 1962, eighty-seven United Nations member states, including
most of the major industrialized nations and the Third World
countries, voted in favor of a resolution entitled "Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. '72 There were twelve abstentions, including the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc
derives from § 92(13) of the British North America Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict. 6,
c.28, § 4, which gives the provinces the power to legislate on all matters of
"Property and Civil Rights." In R. v. Stanley, [1936] 1 D.L.R. 100, the Appellate

Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta held that confiscatory legislation
would be valid if the subject matter of such legislation came within the "civil
and property rights" jurisdiction of the province. Id. at 103.

68. See Molot & Laux, supra note 67.
69. G.A.- Res. 626, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952).
70. Id.
71.

See H. STEMnR & D. VAGTS, supra note 43, at 463.

72. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Plenary (Agenda Item 62), U.N. Doc.
A/5344/Add.1,A/L.412/Rev.2 (1962).
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countries. Only two countries opposed the resolution.7 3 The resolution declared in part:
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over
their natural wealth and resources must by exercised in the interest of their national developments and of the well-being of the people of the state concerned.
2. The exploitation, development and disposition of such resources,
as well as the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, shall be in conformity with the rules and conditions which
the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable
with regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such
activities.
3. In cases where authorization is granted, the capital imported
and the earnings on that capital shall be governed by the term
thereof, by the national legislation in force, and by international
law. The profits derived must be shared in the proportions freely
agreed upon, in each case, between the investors and the recipient
state....
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based
on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner
shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the
rules and force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of
its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In any
case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the state taking such measures
shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States
and other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute shall be
made through arbitration or international adjudication .... 74
The United States vQted in favor of the resolution because it requires adequate compensation for the expropriation of alien investors' property.75
The 1962 resolution casts doubt upon the legitimacy of two areas of the National Energy Program. First, the express requirement for compensation in paragraph four may require Canada to
compensate the foreign-controlled companies for the twenty-five
percent carried interest in the Canada lands.76 Second, this carSee H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 43, at 464.
74. See G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 72.
73.

75.

See

HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

76. See note 64 supra.

457 (1979).
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tied interest scheme arguably violates the principle that profits
derived from the exploitation of natural resources in the host
country must by shared in proportions freely agreed upon." The
Canadian Government would undoubtedly respond to such criticism by stating that the overriding principle in this important
resolution is the right to assert state sovereignty over natural
resources.
In 1966, another General Assembly resolution, also entitled
"Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources," was passed78
by an overwhelming majority of 104 countries. Conspicuous
among the six countries abstaining was the United States, which
was strongly opposed to paragraph five which
[r]ecognize[d] the right of all countries, and in particular of the
developing countries, to secure and increase their share in the administration of enterprises which are fully or partly operated by
foreign capital and to have a greater share in the advantages and
profits derived therefrom on an equitable basis, with due regard to
the development needs and objectives of the peoples concerned
and to mutually acceptable contractual practices, and calls upon
the countries on which such capital originates to refrain from any
action which would hinder the exercise of that right....

80

This global consensus would have great significance for the legitimacy of Canadian nationalization under the National Energy
Program. The principles enunciated in the resolution could justify
virtually all of the Canadian proposals, including the carried interest scheme. The scheme was passed to secure and increase the
control by the host country over the administration of enterprises
operated with foreign capital. The objective of this plan was to
increase the Canadian profits derived from resource exploitation
on federal lands. The next question is whether economic sovereignty was equitably asserted. The United States reaction to the
National Energy Program was a predictable consequence of its
strong protest against the 1966 United Nations resolution:
The United States abstained .

.

. although [the resolution] con-

tains much with which we agree... [A]t the same time, there are
elements of the resolution with which the United States does not
77.

Id.

78. G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (19.66).
79. See H. STrnERE & D. VAGTS, supra note 43, at 466.
80. G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), supra note 78.
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fully agree. National participation in the administration of foreign
enterprises is desirable in principle and is generally desirable in
practice. However it would be a mistake to state that there is a
right to secure an increased share in the administration of an enterprise regardless of the practical considerations, the contractual
obligations and the equities of the case. Similarly it is impossible
for us to agree that under all circumstances there is a right of
countries to secure an increase of their share in the advantages and
profits derived from the exploitation of their natural resources
when it is fully or partly carried out by foreign capital. ....[Paragraph 5] does not state with sufficient clarity the fact that no country can escape the obligations arising out of international law and
economic cooperation and out of contractual arrangements which
81
have been mutually accepted. ....
In 1973 the General Assembly passed yet another resolution entitled "Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources," which
reaffirmed the rights of all states to assert their economic sovereignty over their natural resources. 2 Paragraph three, which dealt
with the measure of compensation, provides the only novel addition to this resolution:
[T]he application of the principle of nationalization carried out by
States, as an expression of their sovereignty in order to safeguard
their natural resources, implies that each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation, and the mode of payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in
accordance with a national legislation of each State carrying out
such measures ....83
Eighty-six countries approved of the principles in this paragraph,
dissented, and twenty-eight countries
eleven countries
8'
abstained.
In May 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution, without a vote, entitled "Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order. 8 5 Although the bulk of the resolution was devoted to narrowing the gap between the wealth of
Statement by Ambassador Roosevelt, reprinted in H. STEINER & D.
supra note 43, at 466.
82. G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973).
83. Id.
84. See H. STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 43, at 467.
85. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), S-5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/
9556 (1974).
81.

VAGTS,
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the developed and developing countries, one paragraph addressed
the matter of expropriation. Paragraph 4(e) of the Declaration
stated that the right of each state to nationalize natural resources
was an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of that state.
The Declaration did not expressly mention any requirement of
compensation. 8 The United States once again made a reservation
to the Declaration, stating that it conflicted with international
law because it failed to mandate compensation for the confisca87
tion or expropriation of alien property.
Finally, in December 1974 the General Assembly adopted another resolution entitled "The Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States."8 8 The United States and the other major Western industrialized countries voted against the resolution. The
Charter was approved by a vote of one hundred twenty in favor
to six votes in opposition, with Canada notably among the abstentions.8 9 Perhaps Canada's abstention indicates that its resource industry and the level of foreign control of its resource industry make Canada one of the seven major industrialized
countries in the world; nonetheless, it is still very much a developing country. The Charter expressly required appropriate compensation for nationalization, expropriation, or transfer of ownership of foreign property, but only after
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the state considers relevant. In any case where the
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing state and by its
tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all states concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the
sovereign equality of states and in accordance with the principle of
free choice of means.90
If the laws of the expropriating state stipulated that only nominal
compensation was appropriate (e.g., when the host country

86. Id.
87. See Statement by Ambassador Scali, reprinted in H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, supra note 43, at 467, and 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERMIS 744 (1974).

88. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1974). The resolution is most often cited by the developing nations at the
United Nations who claim that economic sovereignty takes precedence over private property rights in international law.
89. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 43, at 467.

90. G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), supra note 82.
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claimed the foreign company had made excessive profits), the
Charter presumably would sanction such compensation. Perhaps
the Charter would also sanction the retroactive twenty-five percent carried interest by the federal government under the National Energy Program on the basis that such action is justifed by
prior government tax incentives and payments to the foreign exploration companies. The suggestion that disputes regarding compensation be settled by only the domestic tribunals of the expropriating state pursuant to its laws prima facie would forbid the
government of the alien investors' home state from presenting
their claims under a domestic foreign investment guarantee program such as that of the United States.9 1 The United States again
objected to the Charter because the principles contained therein
did not fully recognize "respect for agreements and international
obligations, and the endorsement of concepts of producer cartels
and indexation of prices."92
The voting pattern of the General Assembly makes it clear that
from 1952 to the present date there has been a major split between the Western capital-exporting countries and the Soviet
bloc and Third World countries as to the method and measure of
compensation for expropriated property.93 No resolution of the
General Assembly, however, has ever expressly denied that compensation must be given by a state that expropriates alien investors' property in its territory. Traditionally, resolutions of the
General Assembly are not viewed as a source of international law
or as legally binding precedents on the member nations." This is
91. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a United States Government agency, provides investment insurance to United States corporations for
the risk of expropriation by the host country. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200 (1976
& Supp. III 1979). See also 73 Am. J. INr'L L. 104 (1979).
92. See DEP'T STATE BULL. 146 (1975). Excerpts are reprinted in H. STmnR

& D. VAGTS, supra note 43, at 468.
93. The Group of Eminent Persons recognizes this principle: "The right of
every country to nationalize the assets of any company should not be questioned. The real bone of contention is the amount to be paid, the manner in
which it should be determined, and the extent to which the home countries
should involve themselves in the issue." Report, supra note 62, at 826.
94. See the impact of Judge Lauterpacht of the International Court of Justice on this issue in Fitzmaurice, Hersch Lauterpacht-the Scholar as Judge,
Part II, 38 BRrr. Y.B. IN'L L. 1 (1962). See also Haight, The New International
Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 9
INT'L LAW 591, 597 (1975): "Under the United Nations Charter the General Assembly may discuss and make recommendations, but it is not a lawmaking body
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especially important to the capital-exporting members of the
United Nations since without the consent of these states, resolutions concerning expropriation would be meaningless. When there
seems to be global consensus on a principle or a series of resolutions, however, General Assembly declarations will inevitably
affect the attitude and actions of the global community and may
95
evolve into customary law.
Recent case law from international tribunals and domestic

courts seems to reinforce the thesis that a state must pay some

form of compensation for expropriated property. In Texaco Overseas Petroleum v. Libya, 9" a case arising following the Libyan
expropriation of the assets of two United States oil companies operating under government concession agreements, the arbitration
tribunal held that "by expressing an opinio communis, Resolu-

tion 1803 (XVII) [i.e., the 1962 General Assembly resolution]
seems to this tribunal to reflect the state of customary law in this

field. 9' 7 The arbitration tribunal found that subsequent conflicting resolutions did not affect the 1962 resolution which evidenced
a norm of customary international law. The conflicting resolutions

were not supported "by any of the developed countries with market economies which carry on the largest part of international

trade. 91 8 The tribunal went on to hold that "international law
may operate as a factor limiting the freedom of the state should
and its Resolutions, no matter how solemnly expressed or characterized, nor how
often repeated, do not make law or have binding effect."
95. For eminent jurists supporting this view, see Schacter, The Relation of
Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations, 109 ACADEMIE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL, RECUEiL DES CoURs 165, 181-84 (1963); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

5 (1963); White, A New InternationalEconomic Order?, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 323,
330 (1976); J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
(1969); Falk, The Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60
AM. J. INT'L L. 702 (1966). In 1974 the General Assembly also passed a resolution which declared that "the development of International Law may be reflected, inter alia by declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly which
may to that extent be taken into consideration by the International Court of
Justice. . .

."

29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 141, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), re-

printed in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 249 (1975).
96. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. (Libya)(Int'l Arbitral Tribunal 1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 3 (1978). The Arbitral Tribunal consisted
of a single arbitrator-Professor Dupuy.
97. Id. at 30.
98. Id. at 31.
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foreign interest be affected, even though Article 2 [of the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States] does not state this explicitly."99 And the United States District Court for the Central
District of California recently cited the 1962 General Assembly
resolution as being one of "the standards recognized under international law."100
The United States position regarding the method and measure
of compensation was first formulated by United States Secretary
of State Hull in a letter to the Mexican ambassador during the
1940 negotiations concerning Mexican expropriations: 101 "[T]he
right to expropriate property is coupled with and conditioned on
the obligation to make adequate, effective and prompt compensation. The legality of an expropriation is in fact dependent upon
the observance of this requirement."102 A further definition of
such compensation can be found in the Harvard Draft Convention on State Responsibility:
The taking, under the authority of the State, of any property of
any alien, or the use thereof, for a public purpose clearly recognized as such by a law of general application in effect at the time of
the taking is wrongful if not accompanied by prompt payment of
compensation in accordance with the highest of the following
standards:
(a) Compensation which is no less favorable than that granted
to nationals of such State; or
(b) just compensation in terms of the fair market value of the
property or the use thereof unaffected by this or other takings
or by conduct attributable to the State and designed to depress the value of the property in anticipation of the taking;
or
(c) if no fair market exists, just compensation in terms of the
fair market value of such property or of the use thereof. If a
treaty requires a special standard of compensation, then the
compensation shall be paid in accordance with the treaty." 3
99. Id.
100. InternationalAssociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. The
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 533, 567 (C.D.
Cal. 1979).

101. Excerpts of the notes sent by Secretary of State Hull to the Mexican
Ambassador in Washington and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are reprinted in
3 HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 655-66 (1942).
102. Id.

103. Art. 10, para. 2, The Draft Convention, reprinted in Sohn & Baxter,
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The Restatement (Second) of United States Foreign Relations
Law states that just compensation must be "adequate in amount,
paid with reasonable promptness, and paid in a form that is effectively realizable by the alien." 10 4 Effective payment would probably necessitate that compensation be in an easily convertible currency. Many Congressional acts permit United States retaliation
against countries expropriating United States investors' property
without prompt payment of adequate compensation. 105 Using this
analysis, the United States Government could assert that Canada's charge of twenty-five percent carried interest is a retroactive form of uncompensated confiscation. The Canadian Government could counter such allegations with the following
arguments: (1) the twenty-five percent carried interest in the Canada lands is justified in view of the high revenues of foreigncontrolled multinational oil companies caused by past government taxation incentives; and (2) future tax policy for sufficiently
Canadian-controlled companies continues to provide adequate
compensation for the twenty-five percent carried interest.10 6
Expropriation without lump sum compensation is a novel idea
that has not been tested in international courts and tribunals.
There are arguments for and against the legitimacy of such a
scheme. It cannot be denied that compensation through future
taxation and incentive policies may be superior to a lump sum
settlement that may not accurately represent the lost value of the
asset and that may not take into account future profits. Allowing
a partly expropriated foreign interest to continue business in the
host state under an advantageous taxation policy may in time allow the entity to recoup its lost assets and profits. This might be
especially true in the resource section when the exploration and
development costs are admittedly enormous, yet revenues from
Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interest of Aliens, 55 AM.
J. INT'L L. 545, 553 (1961).
104. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 187 (1965).
105. The most important are: The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101
(1974); The Inter-American Development Bank Act, 22 U.S.C. § 28 (1976); The
International Development Association Act, 22 U.S.C. § 284 (1976); The Asian
Development Bank Act, 22 U.S.C. § 285 (1976); The Africa Development Fund
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 290(g) (1976); The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1976).
106. For the precise taxation implications of the National Energy Program,
see PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co. TAX BULL. (Oct. 1980).
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production are eventually perhaps even greater. On the other
hand, the favorable taxation policies would possibly have been instituted even if the assets had not been expropriated.
It could be argued that justifying a scheme of compensation on
past taxation policies is totally unacceptable because it is a retroactive measure. Thus, in the analogous situation of Chile's expropriation of the United States mining interest, the Allende regime
ordered the Chilean Comptroller General to deduct the past excess profits of the United States companies in computing compensation, or to give special consideration to the normal profitability that such companies would have obtained in general
international operations. 107 The expropriated United States mining companies and the United States Government were outraged
by this retroactive measure of compensation. President Nixon described the measure as an ex post facto application of unprecedented legal rules.108 In response, the Chileans argued that the
assertion of a state's economic sovereignty includes remedying
past exploitation and domination by foreign interests, even if this
necessitates retroactive legislation. This reflects the Chileans'
adoption of the traditional Latin American legal principle that
ownership of natural wealth resources can never be alienated
from the state in which they are found, and that foreign interests
have only a right to extract such resources.10 9 Such foreign interests are, therefore, entitled only to compensation for plants and
equipment, and the profits belong to the people. Any excessive
share in the profits by the foreign firms requires repayment to the
people. 1 0 The Chileans also pointed out that many United States
laws were retroactive, including personal and property taxation
laws and contractual rights imposed by the Government.1 1

107. The Chilean Law No. 17, 450 of July 15, 1971, is translated in English
in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1067 (1971). See generally H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,

supra note 43, at 444-58.
108. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 43, at 452.

109. Id. at 451. The Chileans also based their arguments on the principle of

unjust enrichment found both in domestic and international law. As one emi-

nent jurist points out, however, it could be argued that the principle of unjust
enrichment could be used to assert the requirement of compensation for expro-

priated property. See Arechaga, State Responsibilityfor the Nationalizationof

the Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 179 (1978). See also
H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 43, at 454.

110. Id.
111. Id. at 454.
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In any debate on the validity of its scheme Canada could also
argue that the international legal standard under which a state is
required to treat an alien investor is the same as the standard by
which it is legally bound to treat its own nationals. This is known
as the national treatment standard.1 1 2 The Latin American states
are the chief adherents to this standardL' s The Canadian Government could argue that it has applied the twenty-five percent
carried interest even to its national companies (e.g., Dome Petroleum) and has therefore satisfied the national treatment standard. In the dispute over the Mexican expropriation, the Mexican
Government asserted that its expropriations involved confiscation
of Mexican property as well as foreign property in the pursuit of
agrarian reform.1 1 4 The United States Government replied in
these terms:
[T]he statement in your Government's note to the effect that the
foreigners who voluntarily moved to the country not their own...
are not entitled to better treatment than nationals of the country,
presupposes the maintenance of law and order consistent with
principles of international law; that is to say, when aliens are admitted into a country, that country is obligated to accord them
that degree of protection of life and property consistent with the
standards of justice recognized by the law of nations ....n5
The application of the national treatment standard to expropriation of alien investors' property is usually regarded as unacceptable. If a state's treatment of its own nationals does not conform
with basic norms of civilization and justice, it should not be allowed to extend the same treatment to aliens. Most Western democracies have argued that aliens must be treated according to an
international minimum standard.11 6 This standard has been
described by an arbitral tribunal in the following manner: "The
112. See the reports cited in note 113 infra.
113. For a discussion of the "national treatment" standard and other issues
in the area of international responsibility of states, see First Report on the Request of General Assembly for the Codification of the Principles of International

Law Governing State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A1CN4/96 (1956); Second Report, U.N. Doc. AICN4/106 (1957); Third Report, U.N. Doc. A/CN4/111 (1958);

Fourth Report, U.N. Doc. A/CN4/119 (1959); Fifth Report, U.N. Doc. A/CN3/
125 (1960); Sixth Report, U.N. Doc. AICN4/134/Add. 1 (1961).
114. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTs, supra note 43, at 420.
115. Id. at 422.

116. See the work of the International Law Commission on this doctrine in
the reports cited in note 113 supra.
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treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful
neglect of duty, or an insufficiency of governmental actions so far
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.

'117

III. THE NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM: CREEPING
EXPROPRIATION?
If expropriation is governmental activity resulting in the deprivation of the wealth of an alien investor, new terminology such as
"de facto expropriation," "disguised expropriation," or "creeping
expropriation" must be introduced. 8 Such indirect expropriation
generally is achieved through restrictions and infringements
upon: (1) the entry of foreign wealth into the country; (2) the use
of foreign wealth; and (3) the revenues produced from the investment of that wealth. 1 9 Within the first category are situations in
which the host country prohibits the entry of foreign capital into
certain sectors of industry, or the expansion of foreign capital
from one sector of industry to another or within one particular
sector of the industry. In the National Energy Program, the Government stated:
[T]he Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) would also continue
to play a key role in ensuring the Government's Canadianization
goals. Firms that are foreign-controlled will continue to be noneligible firms for FIRA purposes. Moreover, the Foreign Investment Review Agency will vigorously enforce its investment criteria
in the energy sector. The Government does not want to see the oil
companies use their cash flow to expand into the non-energy part
of the economy. Nor does it want foreign-controlled firms to buy
120
already-discovered oil and gas reserves.

The second category involves situations in which the host state
decreases the use of foreign wealth by increasing public sector
117. The Neer Claim, 4 R. INT'L ARB. AwARDs 60, 61-62 (1926).
118. For a lengthy discussion of this type of expropriation see Weston, "Con-

structive Takings" under InternationalLaw: A Modest Foray into the Problem
of "Creeping Expropriation," 16 VA. J.

INT'L

L. 103 (1975). See also Christie,

What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law? 38 BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 307 (1962); Vagts, Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1978).
119. See Weston, supra note 118, at 154.
120. ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 50.
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ownership in a particular industry. Through taxation and exclusive rights and concessions, the host state gives the public sector
an overwhelming and arguably unfair competitive edge in the
marketplace. The host government may also provide the same advantage to its nationals. The National Energy Program is replete
with these governmental actions. 21 Petro-Canada, the state oil
company, already had tremendous competitive advantages and
will also benefit from the twenty-five percent carried interest in
the federal lands and the requirement of Canadian participation
in fifty percent of all oil and gas production in these areas. PetroCanada is the major beneficiary of the governmental objective to
publicly take over several foreign-controlled firms. 22 It is obvious
that the National Energy Program is replete with policies using
incentive payments and other preferential treatment 123 to give
private Canadian companies and individuals a distinct competitive edge over foreign-controlled firms.
Under the last category of methods for achieving indirect expropriation of foreign wealth, the host government can use exorbitant taxation policies or retroactive reevaluation of existing
rights and contracts. In response, the foreign-controlled firms
could allege that the National Energy Program constitutes creeping expropriation. Through taxation, administrative policies, and
other governmental programs that do not require the absolute
transfer of foreign wealth to the state or its nationals, a host
country can make operating unprofitable by imposing severe burdens and inferior competitive status on foreign corporations, thus
creating de facto expropriation. Such governmental regulations
could be designed to depress the trading shares of foreign-controlled firms so that a voluntary takeover by the public sector
becomes more attractive. There is a lack of global consensus as to
whether the use of creeping expropriation breaches the minimum
international legal standard and gives rise to a requirement for
compensation. Since most of the firms affected by the National
Energy Program are controlled by the United States, definitions
of expropriation formulated by United States entities are particularly salient. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), which administers the American Foreign Investment
Guarantee Program, defines expropriatory action as follows:

121. Id. at 38-52.
122. Id. at 52.
123. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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The term 'Expropriatory Action' means any action which is taken,
authorized, ratified or condoned by the Government of the Project
Country commencing during the Insurance Period, with or without
compensation therefore, and for a period of one year directly results in preventing:
(b) the investor from effectively exercising its fundamental
rights with respect to the Foreign Enterprise either as a
shareholder or as a creditor, as the case may be, acquired as a
result of the investment; provided, however, that rights acquired solely as a result of any undertaking by or agreement
with the government of the project country, shall not be considered fundamental rights merely because they are acquired
from such undertaking or agreement; or
(c) the Foreign Enterprise from exercising effective control
over the use of disposition of a substantial portion of its property or24 from constructing their Project or operating the
1

same.

The general terms and conditions of OPIC go on to list exceptions
to the above definition of expropriatory action:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no such action shall be deemed an
expropriatory action, if it occurs or continues in effect, during the
aforesaid period, as the result of:
1) any law, degree, regulation or administrative action of the
Government of the Project Country which is not by its express terms for the purpose of nationalization, confiscation or
expropriation (including but not limited to intervention, condemnation or other taking), is reasonably related to constitutionally sanctioned governmental objectives, is not arbitrary,
is based upon a reasonable classification of entities to which it
applies and does not violate generally accepted principles of
international law. .. 115
Under OPIC's definition, an investor is a multinational parent
company or an individual who makes a guaranteed investment in
the host country in the form of a subsidiary company organized
under the host country's laws. 126 The subsidiary company is re124. Art. 1.13 OPIC (234 KGT 12-70), reprinted in H. STErnER & D. VAGTS,
supra note 43, at 474.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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ferred to as the foreign enterprise in OPIC's general terms.1 17
Some of the National Energy Program policies may constitute expropriatory actions as defined by OPIC, especially the twenty-five
percent carried interest. Additionally, a retroactive interest in oil
and gas production in the Canada lands could constitute an
infringement of the foreign enterprise's fundamental rights. The
federal government could argue, however, that the National
Energy Program falls within exceptions to the definition of expropriatory action. Ensuring Canadian participation in the development of the oil and gas industry may be viewed as a constitutionally sanctioned government objective that conforms with
international law.
Richard Baxter and Louis Sohn have established guidelines for
creeping expropriation in international law. In the Draft Harvard
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, they provide a definition of "the taking of
property":
3(a) 'A taking of property' includes not only an outright taking of
property, but also any such unreasonable interference with the use,
enjoyment or the disposal of property as to justify an inference
that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy or dispose of
the property within a reasonable period of time after the inception
of such interference.
5. An uncompensated taking of property of an alien which results
from the execution of the tax laws; from a general change in the
value of currency; from the action of the competent authorities of
the State in the maintenance of public order, health, or morality;
or from the valid exercise of their belligerent rights; or is otherwise
incidental to the normal operation of the laws of the State shall
not be considered wrongful, provided:
(a) It is not a clear and discriminatory violation of the law of
the State concerned;
(c) It is not an unreasonable departure from the principles of
justice recognized by the principle legal systems of the world;
and
(d) It is not an abuse of the powers specified in this para128
graph for the purpose of depriving an alien of his property.

127. Id.
128. Draft Convention, supra note 103, art. 10.
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Tax, laws and other governmental policies involved in the National Energy Program may interfere with the use, enjoyment,
and disposal of foreign investment wealth in Canada, thus depriving foreign-controlled firms of their property rights. Canada could
justify any interference since most legal systems allow such sovereign assertions of economic sovereignty.
In an analogous domestic situation, the United States Supreme
Court has held that a statute violates the fifth amendment protection of private property when it prohibits mining that causes
private houses to subside.
It is our opinion that the Act cannot be sustained as an exercise of
the police power, so far as it affects the mining of coal under
streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has
been reserved.... What makes the right to mine coal valuable is
that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially imfor
practicable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect
29
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.2
Under this approach to private property, the exercise of the tax,
administrative, and other governmental powers might be an illegal or indirect expropriation of alien investors' property, especially when the host country's regulations eliminate the profits
from a United States investment. Undoubtedly, the Canadian
Government would vehemently deny that the National Energy
Program would make the foreign-controlled oil and gas firms
unprofitable.
Decisions from international tribunals and foreign courts have
been less severe than the United States approach to creeping expropriation. 1 0 In Kugele v. Poland,131 the Upper Silesia Arbitral
Tribunal dealt with an allegation by a brewer in Polish Upper
Silesia that the consistent and exorbitant license fees imposed by
the Polish authorities forced his business to liquidate. The Court
dismissed the claim, stating:
The increase of the tax cannot be regarded as a taking away or
impairment of the right to engage in trade, for such taxation presupposes the engaging in the trade. It is true that taxation may
render the trade less remunerative, or altogether unremunerative.
129. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 399 (1922).
130. See, e.g., Luther v. Sagor [1921] 3 K.B. 532, 559.
131. Kugele v. State of Poland Upper Silesia Arbitral Tribunal (1932), 34
ANN. DIG. 69 (1931-32), quoted in H. STrzNm & D. VAGTs, supra note 43, at 492.

Summer 1981]

CANADIAN ENERGY PROGRAM

However, there is an essential difference between the maintenance
of a certain rate of profit in an undertaking and the legal and factual possibility of continuing the undertaking. The trader may feel
compelled to close his business because of the new tax. . . . But
this does not mean that he has lost the right to engage in the trade.
For had he paid the tax, he would be entitled to go on with his
business. 13 2
In response to similar criticism, the Canadian Government has
attempted to justify its taxation and Canadianization policies, including the twenty-five percent carried interest in the Canada
lands, by pointing to practices in non-OPEC oil-producing
countries.
The control of foreign investment in the energy industry is widely
recognized in other countries as an integral part of national economic policy. Great Britain, Norway, Australia and Mexico are
four non-OPEC oil producers which have implemented a variety of
measures to limit foreign ownership of production and other aspects of industry activity.
In Great Britain and Norway, the national oil companies are assured the major role in development of energy production from the
North Sea. The British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) has first
claim on a 51% share of oil production, but must negotiate the
purchase of this share at market prices. In developing these areas
from exploration to production, it may offer participation to jointventure partners, including foreign-owned firms, but retains control of all projects.
In Norway, the Statoil en Norske Stats Objeselskap A.S.
(Statoil) competes aggressively with other firms in the exploration
and development of off-shore areas. It is authorized to take up to a
50% interest in any block of land it does not already hold. The
company takes this interest after a find has been delineated but
before development and makes no payment for past exploration
expenditures. It also has the option to increase its interest to 70%
at its own discretion. Indeed, Statoil acts as the operator in charge
of activities on all properties in which it has an investment, often
with a major private oil company acting as a paid adviser.
In Australia, foreign companies are allowed to participate fully
at the exploration stage. However, only Australian and "naturalized" foreign investors can produce energy resources. To qualify as
"naturalized", a foreign company must have a minimum of 25% of
its equity owned by Australians, a majority of Australians on its

132. H. STEnWR & D.

VAGTS,

supra note 43, at 492.
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Board of Directors and a public commitment to increase Australian
equity to 51%. Access by foreign firms to the Australian debt markets is restricted, and takeovers cannot normally be financed with
funds raised there.
Of these four countries, Mexico has the most rigorous system of
controls having nationalized the foreign-owned petroleum industry
in 1938. The exploration, development and production of petroleum, other hydrocarbons, and electricity is reserved entirely for
the Government. Other activities, such as the distribution and
marketing of petroleum
products, are reserved entirely for Mexi1
can-owned companies. 33
The Canadian Government virtually copied the Norwegian energy
policy in its decision to take a twenty-five percent carried interest
in leases on the Canada lands, though the percentage of the carried interest is even greater in the Norwegian policy.13 ' These
practices in non-OPEC oil-producing countries may express an
evolving norm of customary international law under which the resource sector is deemed so important to state security that certain
types of indirect or disguised expropriation are permissible.
Although such an argument may once have been outrageous, it
now seems plausible in light of the scarcity and instability of energy resources in the world today.
In 1975 Canada signed an OECD agreement entitled "Declaration of International Investment and Multinational Enterprises." 3 5 The Declaration consisted of guidelines governing the
relationship between the host country and the multinational firm,
and it required that foreign multinationals be accorded national
treatment.'
The Declaration interpreted national treatment to
mean
that Member countries should, consistent with their needs to
maintain public order, to protect their essential security interests
and to fulfill commitments relating to international peace and security, accord to enterprises operating in their territories and
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of another
Member country (hereinafter referred to as 'Foreign-Controlled
Enterprises') treatment under their laws, regulations and administrative practices, consistent with international law and no less

133. ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 21.
134. Id.
135. See OECD DECLARATON, supra note 64.

136. Id. at 968.
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favorable than that accorded in like situations to domestic
enterprises.
[T]his Declaration does not deal with the right of Member countries to regulate the entry of foreign investment or the conditions
of establishment of foreign enterprises.137
United States officials have argued that the minimum requirement of fifty percent Canadian ownership, the granting of export
licenses based on Canadian ownership, and the obligation to buy
Canadian goods and services as discussed in the National Energy
Program is a breach of the OECD national treatment standard.'"
To rebut such an argument, the Canadian Government could reiterate the statement made to OECD in 1976 by Minister of External Affairs Allan MacEachen, in which he indicated that particular circumstances in Canada regarding foreign investment gave
Canada the right to take appropriate measures. 139 It seems that
there are no clear principles delineating situations in which creeping expropriation amounts to a breach of the minimum international legal standard. In view of the above discussion, however,
the most suspect provision of the National Energy Program is the
twenty-five percent carried interest in the federal lands.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Canadian National Energy Program provides insight into
the critical global debate on the expropriation of alien investors'
property. Sovereign states can no longer expropriate by forced
and outright transfers of an alien's assets without any compensation.14 0 States which expropriate in this manner face massive retaliation from the powerful capital-exporting countries through,
inter alia, the cutting of trade and commercial ties, the freezing
of assets, retaliatory diplomatic moves, and court action in the
home state of the investors. 4 1 The principles of international law

137. Id.

138. See The Financial Post, Dec. 4, 1980, at 4.
139. Id. United States officials have argued, however, that the Minister's
statement was not a formal reservation, especially in view of the endorsement of
the Declaration of Canada. As to whether the Declaration can be regarded as

legally binding in the first place, see Schwartz, Are the OECD and UNCTAD
Codes Legally Binding?, 11 IN'L LAW. 529 (1977).

140. See Molot & Laux, supra note 67.
141. The freezing of another state's assets is a highly effective device as
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and policy concerning expropriation are gradually evolving
through diplomatic negotiations, international and domestic
courts and tribunals, resolutions at the General Assembly of the
United Nations, and through state practice. Although sovereign
states must understand and comply with these principles of international law, disguised or creeping expropriation will become
more appealing to both developed and developing countries. The
use of taxation powers and the voluntary takeover of foreign investment of state enterprises, especially in revenue-rich sectors of
industries, will be especially attractive to countries like Canada
which face massive national budget deficits. Pressure to depress
the value of foreign investment before a public sector takeover
will be enormous in countries in which the public purse does not
contain the reserves needed for voluntary takeover of foreign-controlled firms. Added to these factors is the inevitability of expropriation of foreign interests in resource industries due to the benefits of national control over energy resources in an energystarved world. Expropriation will not be a phenomenon limited to
developing countries. Many sovereign states will seek to undertake some form of expropriation that falls short of violating their
international legal obligations.
The Canadian Government took some of its ideas from nonOPEC oil-producing countries in constructing its National Energy
Program.1 42 The Canadian National Energy Program may form a
prototype that other countries will copy. In this context the question of the legitimacy of Canada's program as an assertion of economic sovereignty or its illegitimacy as creeping expropriation
must be discussed. The imposition of taxation policies should not
be regarded as amounting to creeping expropriation in international law, unless such taxation measures are directed exclusively
against foreign-controlled corporations to render them totally unprofitable in the short and the long term. On the other hand, the
use of incentive payment schemes or direct grants by governments to lessen the impact of a nondiscriminatory taxation regime on national corporations should not be regarded as a facet of

demonstrated during the recent Iran hostage crisis. Likewise, the growing ten-

dency on the part of capital countries to allow foreign sovereigns to be sued in
their courts for illegitimate expropriation without compensation is another
major deterrent to outright confiscation. See, e.g., the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 28 U.S.C. § 1602-1611 (1976).

142. See

ENERGY PROGRAM,

supra note 1.
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creeping expropriation. If the Government is using the incentive
payment scheme or direct grants in bad faith to implement a disguised discriminatory taxation regime that would make only the
foreign-controlled corporations unprofitable, such measures
should be regarded as creeping expropriation. In view of the strategic importance of the natural resources sector of a national
economy, this section deserves special reference when determining the legitimacy of governmental action designed to acquire a
major percentage interest in the operations of a foreign-controlled
corporation without compensation. Based upon state practice, a
government may be allowed to acquire a share in the development and exploitation of its natural resources. The arguments of
Dome Petroleum seem reasonable and compatible with such assertions of economic sovereignty.14 3 Dome Petroleum suggested
that if the Government wished to acquire a share in the production of natural resources, it should either exclude preexisting operations (e.g., when the oil- and gas-producing wells have already
been discovered) or contribute towards expenses incurred in discovering oil and gas reserves. 4 If governments accepted these
guidelines, then the acquisition of a percentage interest in operations of foreign-controlled firms without compensation would be
easier to justify as not being a retroactive confiscation of acquired
rights.
Even when achieved with public funds, the voluntary takeover
of foreign-controlled enterprises does not constitute expropriation
in international law. The marketplace must determine the price
of such acquisition, however, without government interference.
Since a takeover price predetermined by a government would
amount to outright confiscation under international law, 4 5 and
would be unacceptable to the home countries of the foreign investors concerned, the observance by governments of such principles
could help develop a utilitarian formula whereby economic sovereignty becomes compatible with foreign investment in the strategic natural resources sector of a nation's economy.

143. Report on Business, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 3, 1980, at B5.

144. Id.
145. This was the position taken by the United States Government when
Chile expropriated the United States copper interests. See H. STmNER & D.
VAGTS, supra note 43, at 444-58.

